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Goins v. Angelone, 226 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2000)
and Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000)
Goins v. Angelone1 and Bacon v. Lee' provide capital defense counsel
guidance on parole eligibility instructions. Christopher Goins ("Goins")
was convicted of one count of capital murder, four counts of first-degree
murder, two counts of malicious wounding and seven counts of illegal use
of a firearm.' He was sentenced to death on the capital murder charge and
to four life terms plus seventy-eight years for the non-capital offenses.4
Robert Bacon ("Bacon") was convicted of first-degree murder and conspir-
acy to commit murder.' He received a death sentence." At trial, both men
sought to have the jury instructed on their parole eligibility.7
I. Goins's Claim
Goins argued that he had a right to tell the jury during voir dire and
sentencing about the nature and possibility of parole! Goins contended
that the trial court should have permitted inquiry during voir dire regarding
the juror's perceptions of life sentences.' Goins's counsel attempted to
instruct the venire on the meaning of a life sentence in Virginia.0 In partic-
ular, counsel sought an instruction specifying that if Goins were convicted
of a Class One felony, he would serve at least thirty years in prison."
1. 226 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2000).
2. 225 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000).
3. Goins v. Angelone, 226 F.3d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2000). For further discussion of the
facts and claims raised, see Christina S. Pignatelli, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 385 (2001)
(analyzing Goins v. Angelone, 226 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2000)).
4. Goins, 226 F.3d at 318-19.
5. Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470,474 (4th Cir. 2000). For further discussion of the facts
and claims raised, see Christina S. Pignatelli, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF.J. 379 (2001) (analyzing
Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000)). Because Bacon was decided in North Carolina,
first degree murder carries a potential death sentence.
6. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 475.
7. See Goins, 226 F.3d at 326; Bacon, 225 F.3d at 485-86.
8. Goins, 226 F.3d at 326.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.;seeVA.CODEANN. $53.1-151(D) (Mchie 1994) (mandating that "aperson who
has been sentenced to two or more life sentences... shall be eligible for parole after serving
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Goins contended that because the trial court did not permit such inquiry,
he was deprived of the right to a fair and impartial jury.12
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit looked to
Simmons v. South Carolina,"3 wherein the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a capital defendant must be permitted to instruct the jury
on the defendant's parole ineligibility when: "(1) if sentenced to life impris-
onment, he will never become eligible for parole; and (2) the prosecution
argues that he presents a future danger." 4 Goins argued that Simmons
should be applied to his situation because he would not be parole eligible for
thirty years."5 The Fourth Circuit, relying on previous decisions, rejected
Goins's argument because "Simmons does not require that a jury be in-
structed on the effects of parole for a parole-eligible defendant." 6
IL Bacon's Claim
Bacon argued that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated because the trial court did not permit a jury instruction regarding
Bacon's eligibility for parole in twenty years if sentenced to life in prison. 7
In order to rebut the State's future dangerousness arguments, at
resentencing, Bacon's counsel presented testimony of witnesses who said
that Bacon would be welcomed back into the community if he received a
twenty years of imprisonment, except that if either such sentence, or both, was or were for
a Class 1 felony violation, and he is not otherwise ineligible for parole... he shall be eligible
for parole only after serving thirty years"). For capital murders committed after 1995, life
imprisonment means life in prison without parole. Prior to 1995, the Virginia Code denied
a endant parole in two instances. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151 (Michie 1994). A
defendant was parole-ineligible if convicted of a third rape, murder or robbery (or any
combinations of these three) so long as the third crime was not part of the same act or
transaction. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1994). A defendant was also parole
ineligible if paroled from a previous life sentence and then sentenced to life imprisonment
again for the commission of a second crime. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(E) (Michie 1994).
The General Assembly of Virginia subsequently abolished parole for all felony offenses
committed on or after January 1, 1995. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1998).
12. Goins, 226 F.3d at 326. Goins further asserted that the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that he be allowed to present evidence of the nature of a
life sentence during sentencing. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XV, S 1.
13. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
14. Goins, 226 F.3d at 326; see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171 (1994).
15. Goins, 226 F.3d at 326-27.
16. Id. at 327 (citing Clagett v. Angelone, 209 F.3d 370, 375 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000)); see
Wilson v. Green, 155 F.3d 396, 408 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that Simmons does not entitle a
capital defendant to an instruction about when he would be parole eligible).
17. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 485.
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life sentence and was later paroled.'8 Bacon then requested an instruction
on parole eligibility, which was refused.' 9
On direct appeal, Bacon also relied on Simmons and contended that the
trial court erredby not giving the requested instruction.20 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina rejected the argument and distinguished Simmons
from Bacon's case because Bacon might eventually be eligible for parole.2'
The district court agreed that Simmons was not applicable to this case.2
The Fourth Circuit affirmed and found that "Simmons applie[d] only to
instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury
decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison." 2' The Fourth Circuit
pointed out that they had never extended Simmons to cases in which the
defendant was parole eligible.24 The court concluded that because Bacon
was parole eligible, he was not entitled to a Simmons instruction. 5
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
As of January 1, 1995, parole for all felony offenses was abolished in
Virginia.2' Simmons mandated that when the prosecution proceeds on a
theory of future dangerousness, the defendant could request a "life means
life" instruction regarding his parole ineligibility. Yarbrougb v. Common-
wealthi s extended the instruction in Virginia to all capital cases regardless of
whether the prosecution proceeded on a theory of future dangerousness or
. 18. Id. One witness was asked, "You think if Robert was given life in prison and served
whatever number of years he served and was released, he would be welcomed back in this
community?" Id. at 482. The witness responded with "I would welcome him. I think his
friends would welcome him.* Id. Another witness was asked, "If the jury does sentence
Robert to life in prison and he serves a number of years, and he's released or paroled, would
you welcome him back in the community, knowing that he's been convicted of first-degree
murder?" Id. at 482-83. This witness also answered affirmatively. Id. at 483.
19. Id. at 485.
20. Id.; see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171 (1994).
21. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 485; see State v. Bacon, 446 S.E.2d 542, 558-59 (N.C. 1994).
22. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 485.
23. Id. at 486 (citing Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2121 (2000)).
24. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 486; see Roach v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 210, 220 (4th Cir. 1999)
(denial of Simmons instruction because defendant was parole eligible); Keel v. French, 162
F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 1998)
(same).
25. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 486.
26. See VA. CODE. ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000) (abolishing parole for all felony
offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995).
27. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (mandating that "life
means life jury instruction is only required when the prosecution argues for the death
penalty on the basis of the defendant's future dangerousness and a life sentence for the
defendant would be without possibility of parole).
28. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
2001]
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vileness.29 Simmons, Yarbrougb, and Virginia Code Section 53.1-165.1
effectively require that the court instruct the jury that "life means life" upon
the defendant's request. Further, defense counsel should note, that when
a non-capital felony carries the possibility of a punishment of life without
parole, the defendant is also entitled to a Simmons instruction upon
request.30 These rules can greatly affect capital sentencing, especially if non-
capital felonies are sentenced before the capital conviction. Defense counsel
should ask that the capital charge be sentenced first so that the jury is not
persuaded to give a death sentence based upon the fact that it gave a life
sentence on the predicate felony.
However, defendants convicted of felony offenses committed prior to
January 1, 1995, are parole eligible, and thus, are not permitted to request
a "life means life" instruction. In the future, many crimes committed prior
to January 1, 1995 may be litigated because of the CODIS database. With
this database, recently acquired DNA evidence may be entered into the
database and result in a "cold hit," or a match. If this occurs, a defendant
could be tried for a crime committed years ago.
Christina S. Pignatelli
29. See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth,519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va. 1999) (finding that the
jury must be instructed that "life means life* upon the defendant's request when the defen-
dant has been convicted of capital murder); see also VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie
2000) (mandating that "[ulpon request of the defendant, a jury shall be instructed that for all
Class 1 felonies committed after January 1, 1995, a defendant shall not be eligible for parole
if sentenced to imprisonment for life").
30. See Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000) (mandating that
juries should be instructed about parole ineligibility in non-capital cases when the defendant
has no chance of being paroled).
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